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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
tion with the first amendment,57 or of simply abandoning the action"
as one that is incompatible with first amendment guarantees. 9
Robert Elton Arceneaux
Rhode Island v. Innis: A HEAVY BLOW TO THE RIGHTS OF A SUSPECT
IN CUSTODY; AND NO "CHRISTIAN BURIAL" TO EASE THE PASSAGE
Defendant, Thomas J. Innis, was arrested on January 17, 1975,
in connection with an armed robbery that had occurred earlier the
same morning. He immediately was advised of his Miranda rights1
by the arresting officer and was given the same warnings a few
moments later when other policemen arrived on the scene. The
defendant indicated that he wished to have a lawyer, was placed in
a car with three police officers, and was en route to the station
house when the officers began conversing among themselves:
"there's a lot of handicapped children running around in this area,
57. Bloustein argues persuasively that the Meikeljohn theory, which was the basis
for the Supreme Court's holding in New York Times v. Sullivan, and which the Court
misapplied in Time, Inc. v. Hill, is the solution to the problem of balancing the right to
privacy with the right to free speech. The Meikeljohn theory, as explained by Blous-
tein, provides that the right to free speech under the first amendment only attaches to
matters which contribute to the public's understanding essential to self-government. In
other words, the only issues of legitimate public interest are those with which the
voters must deal. Were the courts to apply this theory in deciding what is news-
worthy, there would be protection for the press and room for the right against public
disclosure of private facts as well. See Bloustein, Privacy, Tort Law, and the Constitu-
tion: Is Warren and Brandeis' Tort Petty and Unconstitutional as Well?, 46 TEx. L.
REV. 611, 624-28 (1968). See generally Comment, supra note 30; Comment, supra note
33.
58. Some have argued that this may be the proper course of action. Compare
Kalven, supra note 49, with Bloustein, supra note 57.
59. Despite the Campbell decision, there may still be a right to privacy when the
publisher of the private facts is not a member of the "institutional press." In Norris v.
King, 355 So. 2d 21 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 995, rehearing
denied, 439 U.S. 1122 (1978), the court awarded damages when a laundromat owner
posted posters of plaintiff, who had stolen from defendant's coke machines, in an at-
tempt to warn others that they would be caught if they repeated plaintiff's actions.
The court did not address itself to the line of cases which have been interpreted as re-
quiring a public interest privilege. Instead, the court merely found that those cases
were not applicable, since defendant was not a member of the news media. 355 So. 2d
at 24-25. However, it has been argued that the distinction between members of the in-
stitutional press and ordinary citizens for the purpose of application of the public in-
terest privilege may be invalid. See Note, supra note 7, at 1221-22.
1. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
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and God forbid one of them might find a weapon with shells and
they might hurt themselves."2 Defendant thereupon told the officers
to turn the car around and said that he would lead them to the miss-
ing shotgun. The gun was introduced into evidence at a later trial
in which Innis was convicted of robbery, kidnapping, and the murder
of another taxicab driver. Held: Defendant was not "interrogated"
after having invoked his right to counsel. "Interrogation" under
Miranda refers "not only to express questioning, but also to any
words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally
attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are
reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the
suspect."' Rhode Island v. Innis, 100 S. Ct. 1682 (1980).
The Bill of Rights of the United States Constitution imposes on the
federal government the obligation to ensure that "[n]o person ... be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself" and
that "[iln all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right...
to have the assistance of counsel for his defense."5 These rights, the
fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination and the sixth
amendment right to the assistance of counsel, were made applicable
to the states through the fourteenth amendment! Despite this clear
constitutional mandate to the federal government and the correspond-
ing judicial mandate to state governments, there were many instances
of abuse, both physical and mental, in obtaining incriminating remarks
from suspects in police-dominated atmospheres.7 Initially, concern
centered on the possible unreliability of the resulting evidence,' and it
was exluded on the grounds of involuntariness.' As cases arose in
2. Rhode Island v. Innis, 100 S. Ct. 1682, 1685 (1980).
3. Id at 1689.
4. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
5. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
6. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (fifth amendment made applicable to
the states); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (sixth amendment made ap-
plicable to the states).
7. See Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959); Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156
(1953); Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596 (1944); Ashcroft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143
(1944); Ward v. Texas, 316 U.S. 547 (1942); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940);
Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936). See also Developments in the Law-Confes-
sions, 79 HARV. L. REV. 938 (1966).
8. Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 192 (1953): "[Rieliance on a coerced confession
vitiates a conviction because such a confession combines the persuasiveness of ap-
parent conclusiveness with what judicial experience shows to be illusory and deceptive
evidence."
9. Ziang Sung Wan v. United States, 266 U.S. 1, 14 (1924): "[Tlhe requisite of volun-
tariness is not satisfied by establishing merely that the confession was not induced by a
promise or a threat. A confession is voluntary in law if, and only if, it was, in fact, volun-
tarily made."
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which the evidence was clearly reliable, however, the Court shifted
from this view and focused partially on the idea that "[tihe aim of the
rule that a confession is inadmissible unless it was voluntarily made is
to exclude false evidence .... The aim of the requirement of due pro-
cess is not to exclude presumptively false evidence, but to prevent
fundamental unfairness in the use of evidence whether true or
false."" The focus on due process imposed on the states the obliga-
tion to conduct their criminal investigations and their contacts with
potential defendants in a "fair" manner." The Supreme Court ap-
plied a "totality of the circumstances" test to determine volun-
tariness in given circumstances; but, excepting isolated rules
limited to specific factual situations, there were no clear guidelines
'for the states to follow.
In 1964, the Supreme Court decided Massiah v. United States,3
holding that evidence may not be introduced at defendant's trial "of
his own incriminating words, which federal agents had deliberately
elicited from him after he had been indicted and in the absence of
his counsel."" Defendants were thus granted the right to have a
lawyer present during "interrogation" after "judicial proceedings"
had been commenced against them. Massiah's reliance on the sixth
amendment right to counsel was extended even further that year by
the landmark decision of Escobedo v. Illinois.5 The import of this
startling case was its extension of the right to the presence of
counsel to a point in time considerably in advance of the commence-
ment of "judicial proceedings."" In reaching this decision, the Court
10. Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941) (emphasis added). Accord,
Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 540-41 (1961); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172
(1952).
11. Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 320 (1959): '[T]he police must obey the law
while enforcing the law; that in the end life and liberty can be as much endangered
from illegal methods used to convict those thought to be criminals as from the actual
criminals themselves."
12. Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191, 197 (1957).
13. 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
14. Id. at 206. This case, momentous as it may have been, was "lost in the shuffle"
as a consequence of the outcry over a case decided very shortly afterward, Escobedo
v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964). Massiah was to have a far-reaching effect, however,
when later used by the Court in Escobedo and Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387
(1977).
15. 378 U.S. 478 (1964). In Escobedo, the suspect had not been indicted, but was in
police custody and was denied the right to see or speak with his retained counsel. He
was interrogated at length and held incommunicado, despite repeated demands by
both himself and his attorney that they be allowed to confer. The resulting in-
criminating remarks were held by the United States Supreme Court to be inadmissible
at trial.
16. This is a questionable proposition in light of the fact that the sixth amend-
ment right to counsel traditionally has been regarded as a trial right. It has been ex-
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relied on the sixth amendment and Massiah, concluding that the fact
of indictment, or lack thereof, "should make no difference."17 In addi-
tion, the Court appeared to recognize a link between the sixth
amendment right to counsel and the fifth amendment privilege
against compelled self-incrimination: "Our Constitution, unlike some
others, strikes the balance in favor of the right of the accused to be
advised by his lawyer of his privilege against self-incrimination."8 A
great deal of criticism was generated by the Escobedo decision; 9
though it later was limited strictly to its facts, Escobedo gave some
indication of the direction in which the Court was leaning.
Two years after Escobedo v. Illinois, the Supreme Court decided
Miranda v. Arizona." That case finally established concrete
guidelines for the states to follow in their attempts to balance con-
stitutional rights against enforcement needs. "Procedural
safeguards" were implemented by the Court which were designed to
protect a suspect's fifth amendment privilege against compelled self-
incrimination while he was being subjected to "custodial interroga-
tended by the Court to encompass critical stages once judicial proceedings have begun,
but never so far as in Escobedo. This is recognized by Justice Stewart, who in his dis-
sent stated:
The Court disregards this basic difference between the present case and
Massiah's with the bland assertion that "that fact should make no
difference." Ante, p. 485.
It is "that fact," I submit, which makes all the difference. Under our
system of criminal justice the institution of formal, meaningful judicial pro-
ceedings, by way of indictment, information, or arraignment, marks the point
at which .. . constitutional guarantees attach which pertain to a criminal
trial. Among those .. .is the guarantee of the assistance of counsel.
378 U.S. at 493 (Stewart, J., dissenting). See also Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S.
201, 205 (1964), quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 57 (1932):
[D]uring perhaps the most critical period of the proceedings ... that is to
say, from the time of their arraignment until the beginning of their trial,
when consultation, thoroughgoing investigation and preparation [are] vitally
important, the defendants . . .[are] as much entitled to such aid [of counsel]
during that period as at the trial itself.
17. 378 U.S. at 485.
18. Id. at 488 (emphasis added). See Schaefer, Police Interrogation and the
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 61 N.W.L. REV. 506, 506 (1966): "Under Escobedo
v. Illinois it is the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination that gives rise
to the right to counsel during police interrogation ...."
19. Enker & Elsen, Counsel for the Suspect: Massiah v. United States and
Escobedo v. Illinois, 49 MINN. L. REV. 47 (1964); Comment, Constitutional Law-Right
of Counsel-State and Lower Federal Court Interpretations of Escobedo, 44 N.C. L.
REV. 161 (1965); Note, Escobedo in the Courts: May Anything You Say Be Held
Against You, 19 RUTGERS L. REV. 111 (1964).
20. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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tion. '" 1 Among the "safeguards" were included the right to counsel
and the right to be free from interrogation once the right to counsel
was invoked.22 The Court stated in Miranda that it was reaffirming
Escobedo v. Illinois," and the Court again recognized the link be-
tween the right to the presence of counsel and the privilege against
compelled self-incrimination.2 ' The Court redefined this link,
however, in such a way as practically to negate the Escobedo ra-
tionale: The Miranda Court relied almost exclusively on the fifth
amendment right against compelled self-incrimination, rather than
on the sixth amendment right to counsel upon which Escobedo was
based.
[Tihe right to have counsel present at the interrogation is in-
dispensable to the protection of the Fifth Amendment privilege
under the system we delineate today. . . .Accordingly we hold
that an individual held for interrogation must be clearly informed
that he has the right to consult with a lawyer and to have the
lawyer with him during interrogation under the system for pro-
tecting the privilege we delineate today.25
Thus in Miranda, the Supreme Court modified the stand it had
taken earlier in Escobedo.' Later cases show that the fifth amend-
21. Id. at 444:
[Tjhe prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or in-
culpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it
demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the
privilege against self-incrimination. By custodial interrogation, we mean
questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been
taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant way .... Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned
that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be
used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an
attorney, either retained or appointed. The defendant may waive effectuation
of these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and in-
telligently. If, however, he indicates in any manner and at any stage of the
process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking there can
be no questioning. Likewise, if the individual is alone and indicates in any
manner that he does not wish to be interrogated, the police may not question
him.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 442.
24. Id. at 471.
25. Id.
26. See Schwartz, Proceedings of the Twenty-Ninth Annual Judicial Conference
Third Judicial Circuit of the United States, Criminal Justice in the Mid-Sixties:
Escobedo Revisited, 42 F.R.D. 437, 465 (1966): "I think it is worth emphasizing that
[Miranda] is not a right to counsel case. A lot of the precedent, as one of the dissents
points out, comes from the right to counsel cases. But it is a self-incrimination case."
NOTES
ment, as interpreted by the philosophy of Miranda, became increas-
ingly more important, even as the sixth amendment privilege, as in-
terpreted in Escobedo, receded with that case into disuse.
The rules established in Miranda were to be applied strictly and
construed strictly. Any incriminating statement elicited from a
suspect in violation of those rules was to be inadmissible at trial."
The passage of time and a changing Court, however, gave rise to ex-
ceptions. While holding to the basic premise of the Miranda decision,
the Court, in a series of important decisions, began to narrow the
scope of the applicable rules. 8 In general, these post-Miranda cases
tend to limit the Miranda decision and to illustrate that much of the
difficulty that lower courts encountered in dealing with Miranda
was the result of the lack of a clear definition of the term "inter-
rogation."'"
The Supreme Court was given an opportunity to clarify this
issue in Brewer v. Williams" but declined to do so. The facts in
Brewer are very similar to those in the instant case; they should,
therefore, be examined in some detail.
Defendant Williams, known to be a mental patient and deeply
religious, was arrested and arraigned on a charge of murder. After
consulting with two lawyers, he declared that he wished to speak with
his retained counsel before speaking to the police. While en route to
another town in a police car, the defendant was given the now-famous
"Christian Burial Speech"'" which resulted in his leading the police to
27. 384 U.S. at 476-77.
28. Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977) (questioning of a suspect who comes
to police station at request of an officer, is not formally arrested, is falsely told of
evidence against him, and is led to believe that his truthfulness will be considered by
the judge, is not "custodial interrogation" under Miranda and does not require the giv-
ing of Miranda warnings); Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341 (1976) (questioning
of a suspect in his home by Internal Revenue Service investigators after he has
become the "focus" of criminal investigations is not "custodial interrogation" under
Miranda and does not require the giving of Miranda warnings); Michigan v. Mosely,
423 U.S. 96 (1975) (Miranda requires that defendant's right to stop questioning during
interrogation be "scrupulously honored"; statements elicited from a defendant after he
has asked that questioning be stopped are admissible when he is again questioned an
hour later); Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975) (statements obtained from a suspect in
violation of these rules are admissible in court for impeachment purposes); Michigan v.
Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974) (testimony of prosecution witness whose name was elicited
from defendant in violation of Miranda is admissible); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S.
222 (1971).
29. See Note, Criminal Procedure-Defining "Custodial Interrogation" for Pur-
poses of Miranda: Oregon v. Mathiason, 57 ORE. L. REV. 184 (1977).
30. 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
31. Id. at 392-93:
I want to give you something to think about while we're traveling down the
1981)
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the body of the victim. No express questions were asked by the police
officer, but there was a clear appeal to the defendant's moral and
religious beliefs that the Court accepted as being "tantamount to in-
terrogation." 2 However, the Court, instead of clarifying the "inter-
rogation" issue, decided the case entirely on sixth amendment
grounds. Because "judicial proceedings," ie., arraignment, had
begun, and because the officer had "deliberately and designedly set
out to elicit information from [the defendant]," 3 the facts in Brewer
were considered to be "constitutionally indistinguishable from those
presented in Massiah v. United States."4 The Court, therefore,
avoided the difficulties inherent in reconsidering or reformulating
Miranda's definitions and decided Brewer solely on the basis of
Massiah and the sixth amendment right to counsel. In doing so,
however, the Court compounded the preexisting confusion. Whereas
fifth and sixth amendment rights had, to a considerable extent, been
merged in Miranda, these rights were once again distinguished in
Brewer. Furthermore, the Court described the "Christian Burial
Speech" as "tantamount to interrogation," thus alluding to, but only
partially addressing, the "interrogation" issue." The Court utilized
the "deliberately elicited" test as used in Massiah,6 and in doing so,
focused on the intent of the police officer in his dealings with the
suspect. The focus on intent created a test separate and apart from
that which would be utilized in Rhode Island v. Innis.7
In Innis, a taxi driver disappeared on January 12, 1975. His body
was discovered a few days later buried in a shallow grave, his death
having resulted from a shotgun blast to the back of his head. On
January 17, 1975, another taxi driver phoned the police station,
stating that he had just been robbed by a man carrying a sawed-off
shotgun. The police arrested the defendant shortly thereafter in the
road .... Number one, I want you to observe the weather conditions ....
They are predicting several inches of snow for tonight, and I feel that you
yourself are the only person that knows where this little girl's body is ....
And, since we will be going right past the area .... I feel that we could stop
and locate the body, that the parents of this little girl should be entitled to a
Christian burial for the little girl who was snatched away from them on
Christmas [EJve and murdered . . . . rather than waiting until morning and
trying to come back out after a snow storm and possibly not being able to
find it at all.
32. Id. at 400-01.
33. Id. at 399.
34. Id at 400.
35. See Kamisar, Brewer v. Williams, Massiah, and Miranda: What is "Interroga
tion"? When Does It Matter?, 67 GEORGETOWN L.J. 1 (1978).
36. 377 U.S. at 204.
37. 100 S. Ct. 1682 (1980).
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area where the taxi driver had deposited his "fare." The arresting
officer immediately advised Innis of his Miranda rights. A few
moments later, two of the arresting officer's superiors arrived and
repeated the Miranda warnings to Innis, who responded by in-
dicating that he understood his rights and that he wished to speak
with a lawyer. While a search for the shotgun was begun in the area
of the arrest, three officers were dispatched to take Innis to the
police station. 8 The record reflects that each of those officers was
told not to question the suspect, but within seconds, the officers
began talking among themselves: "[t]here's a lot of handicapped
children running around in this area, and God forbid one of them
might find a weapon with shells and they might hurt themselves." 9
Innis interrupted the conversation, telling the officers to turn the
car around; he would lead them to the shotgun. Once back at the
scene of the arrest, Innis was again advised of his Miranda rights.
He said he understood them and still wished to disclose the
whereabouts of the gun because he "wanted to get the gun out of
the way because of the kids in the area in the school. °40 Later, at
trial, the gun was admitted into evidence over objection, and Innis
was convicted of robbery, kidnapping, and the murder of the first
taxi driver.
The trial court, without finding that Innis had been "inter-
rogated," determined that he had waived his Miranda right to
silence." On appeal to the Rhode Island Supreme Court, the convic-
tion was reversed.42 The court, relying in part on Brewer, found that
even though Innis had not been addressed personally, he had invoked
his Miranda right to counsel and, contrary to the Miranda mandate
that all custodial interrogation then cease, he had been "subjected to
,subtle coercion,' that was the equivalent of 'interrogation' within the
meaning of the Miranda opinion."'" The court additionally held that
the record did not support a finding of waiver."
Reversing in a 6-3 decision written by Justice Stewart,' the
38. On the way to the station two of the three officers were in the front seat, and
one was in the back seat with Innis. Only two of them participated in the conversation.
It is unclear whether the policeman seated next to Innis was one of the two officers
participating in the dialogue. If so, the argument that the conversation was meant to
be heard by Innis, and therefore meant to elicit a response, would be strengthened.
39. Id. at 1686.
40. Id. at 1687.
41. Id.
42. State v. Innis, 391 A.2d 1158 (1978).
43. 100 S. Ct. at 1687.
44. 391 A.2d at 1163.
45. It is interesting to note that Justice Stewart dissented in Escobedo and
Miranda, yet wrote the majority opinions for the Court in Massiah, Brewer and Innis.
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United States Supreme Court found that there had been no "inter-
rogation":
"Interrogation," as conceptualized in the Miranda opinion, must
reflect a measure of compulsion above and beyond that inherent
in custody itself. . . . [Tihe term "interrogation" . . . . under
Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but also to any
words or actions on the part of the police other than those nor-
mally attendant to arrest and custody that the police should
know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response
from the suspect. The latter portion of this definition focuses
primarily upon the perceptions of the suspect, rather than the
intent of the police."
The Court found that the officers' remarks were not designed to
elicit an incriminating response, nor were they such remarks as the
policemen should have known were reasonably likely to elicit such a
response. In reaching this conclusion, the Court conceded that Innis
had been subjected to "subtle compulsion."' 7 This finding, however,
was "not the end of the inquiry. It must also be established that a...
response was the product of words or actions on the part of the police
that they should have known were reasonably likely to elicit an in-
criminating response." 8
The Court found that Brewer v. Williams was not applicable in
the Innis case.' 9 By acknowledging the continued existence of the
Brewer rationale, however, and by utilizing a test in Innis different
from that applied in Brewer, the Court creates a substantial
dichotomy. The right to counsel in each of these two cases is based on
different amendments- the fifth in Innis and the sixth in Brewer." By
clarifying this differentiation, the Court has established the existence
of two distinct tests. If "adversary judicial proceedings" have begun,
then the "deliberately elicited" test, as applied by the Brewer court,
will be applicable. If, however, there has been no commencement of
"judicial proceedings," then the fifth amendment Innis test will be
applied, ie., "words or actions on the part of the police that they
should have known were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating
response.""1 Thus, under substantially similar factual situations, the
46. 100 S. Ct. at 1689-90.
47. Id. at 1691.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 1689 n.4. See Grano, Rhode Island v. Innis: A Need to Reconsider the
Constitutional Premises Underlying the Law of Confessions, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1
(1979); White, Rhode Island v. Innis: The Significance of a Suspect's Assertion of His
Right to Counsel, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 53 (1979).
50. 100 S. Ct. at 1689 n.4.
51. Id. at 1691.
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test that will be applied will depend upon where the line is drawn
between the fifth and sixth amendments. That line is not very clear,
because the point at which "judicial proceedings" commence never
has been clearly defined.2 In addition, the fifth amendment privilege
against compelled self-incrimination never has been held to cease at
the time when the sixth amendment right to counsel becomes ap-
plicable. It is difficult then, to imagine a justification for applying two
distinct tests to the right to counsel, when that right, whether based
on the fifth or sixth amendment, is designed to protect a suspect in his
confrontations with the authorities.
The definition of "interrogation" formulated by the Innis Court
could be used effectively to protect the individual, as was envisioned
by the Miranda Court. Included in the phraseology of the definition
is a focus on the perceptions of the suspect,53 thus providing a sub-
jective perspective and providing the suspect with a measure of
"personal protection." Included also is an objective inquiry into the
mind of the policeman 5 -an inquiry whether a reasonable policeman
should have known that his words or actions were likely to elicit an
incriminating response. Though there is no focus on the actual intent
of the policeman in eliciting such a response, the Court states that this
intent, if found, will not be "irrelevant. 5 5 If properly utilized, this
definition could go far in protecting an individual from the dangers in-
herent in a police-dominated atmosphere. Its application in the instant
case, however, seems contrary to the concept of that protection.
Whereas the Court previously had stated that "a confession ob-
tained by compulsion must be excluded whatever may have been the
character of the compulsion,"5 the Innis Court acknowledged that
"subtle compulsion" was utilized, but condoned its use. 7 Whereas
the Miranda Court had attempted to eliminate various methods of
psychological coercion that were taught by police interrogation
manuals,58 the Innis Court accepts as uncoercive the statements by the
officers that were of the type described in those manuals.5 Further-
52. See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682
(1972).
53. 100 S. Ct. at 1689-90.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 1690 n.7.
56. Wan v. United States, 266 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1924).
57. 100 S. Ct. at 1691.
58. INBAU & REID, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS (1962); O'HARA, FUN-
DAMENTALS OF CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION (1956); ROYAL & SCHUTT, THE GENTLE ART OF
INTERVIEWING AND INTERROGATION (1976).
59. The officers in the car with Innis would appear to have used a technique
recommended in pre-Miranda interrogation manuals-they appealed to the moral ele-
ment of the suspect's character. They called forth images of an innocent little han-
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more, the Innis Court gives little guidance to lower courts; if these
statements by the police are not such as would create the reasonable
likelihood that a response will be elicited, one must question what
remarks or actions will be such as to meet this test. The Court, in a
rather poorly developed factual analysis, concludes that the words
were "nothing more than a dialogue between the two officers to
which no response ... was invited,"' 0 that there was no "'functional
equivalent' of questioning,"'" that they were "no more than a few off-
hand remarks,"" and that the record did not suggest "that the of-
ficers' remarks were designed to elicit a response.""e
By deciding that Innis had not been "interrogated," the Court
avoided the difficult question of waiver. The Miranda decision pro-
vided that a "defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, pro-
vided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently." 4
The waiver issue has become the subject of much question and debate"
as to what is required for a defendant to waive his right to counsel once
it has been invoked and whether the right can be waived after a
suspect has been "interrogated" in violation of the Miranda decision.
Both the trial court and the Rhode Island Supreme Court in the in-
stant case addressed the issue, the former finding a waiver, and the
latter not. The United States Supreme Court, however, apparently
chose not to confront the question. The Court stated in a footnote:
"Since we conclude that the respondent was not 'interrogated' ...,
we do not reach the question whether the respondent waived his
right ... ."" Perhaps the Court decided that this was not the proper
case in which to decide the delicate and important waiver issue.
dicapped girl being injured or killed by the suspect's own weapon. The Miranda deci-
sion had gone to great lengths in trying to condemn these techniques. It recognized
that there are many subtle ways in which compulsion can be exerted that may have
psychological effect on a suspect and which, when compounded with seemingly inno-
cent words, will bring forth a desired confession. This decision, therefore, opens the
door for police officers; Innis encourages all forms of subtle compulsion, subject always
to the claim by the officer that, intended or not, the words or actions were not such as
would be reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.
60. 100 S. Ct. at 1690.
61. Id
62. Id at 1691.
63. Id. at 1690 n.9.
64. 384 U.S. at 444.
65. See Note, Fifth Amendment, Confessions, Self-Incrimination-Does a Re-
quest for Counsel Prohibit a Subsequent Waiver of Miranda Prior to the Presence of
Counsel?, 23 WAYNE L. REV. 1321 (1977); Note, Criminal Law-Right to
Counsel- Custodial Criminal Defendant May Not Waive Right to Counsel in the
Absence of His Court-Appointed Attorney, 5 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 401 (1977); Note, Con-
stitutional Law: No Clear Standard for the Waiver of an Asserted Right to Counsel,
29 U. FLA. L. REV. 778 (1977).
66. 100 S. Ct. at 1688 n.2.
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What may prove to be another important aspect of the Innis
decision is that the Court appears to be placing considerable em-
phasis on the lower courts' determination of the interrogation ques-
tion. The Court found it to be "significant" that the trial judge had
considered the officers' remarks to be "entirely understandable."6
Deference to the trial courts' determinations may prove to be a
threat to a defendant's rights, for it weakens much of the benefit of
appellate review. It is submitted that lower courts may attempt to
avoid the more difficult questions of waiver, voluntariness, and
psychological coercion by merely citing Rhode Island v. Innis and by
concluding that the words or actions are not such as to meet the Innis
definition of "interrogation." Appellate courts may then bow to the fac-
tual determination of trial courts, and the defendant will effectively
have been denied a fair determination of the issue. This concern may
have been partially realized in recent decisions handed down after
Innis."
Rhode Island v. Innis should be of particular interest in Loui-
siana, for this state is not constrained by the federal limitations on
the Miranda opinion and, indeed, has indicated that it intends not to
be so constrained.69 Louisiana Revised Statutes 15:451 states that a
confession must be shown to be voluntary "and not made under the
influence of fear, duress, intimidation, menaces, threats, in-
ducements or promises."7 Section 452 provides that "[n]o person
under arrest shall be subjected to any treatment designed by effect
on body or mind to compel a confession of crime."71 These articles
seem to indicate, and the Louisiana jurisprudence is in accord," that
67. Id. at 1690 n.9.
68. See United States v. Henry, 100 S. Ct. at 2192 (1980), (Blackman, J., dissen-
ting) (Innis cited as "reaffirming the 'deliberately elicited' criterion"); State v.
Mulalley, 614 P.2d 820 (Ariz. 1980) (court finds incriminating answers admissible in
response to direct questions asked of defendant who has invoked his Miranda rights);
People v. Albert, 165 Cal. Rptr. 212, 214 (1980) (statement made to juvenile in custody
concerning his bad character and the crime he was suspected of: "That was a cold
thing you did .... selling him that hot car." The court found this to be "just conversa-
tion," and "not intended to have a question mark at the end in a 'question type
fashion' "; the juvenile's statements were admitted in evidence); State v. Jones, 386 So.
2d 1363 (La. 1980). (statements of "condolence" made to a murder suspect; his
responses were admissible); State v. Castillo, 389 So. 2d 1307 (La. 1980) (questions ask-
ed of the defendant before the giving of Miranda warnings and his incriminating
statements were held to be admissible).
69. See In re Dino, 359 So. 2d 586, 590 (La. 1978).
70. LA. R.S. 15:451 (1950).
71. LA. R.S. 15:452 (1950).
72. See, e.g., State v. Sims, 310 So. 2d 587 (La. 1975); State v. Jugger, 217 La. 687,
47 So. 2d 46 (1950); State v. Green, 210 La. 157, 26 So. 2d 487 (1946); State v. Graffam,
202 La. 869, 13 So. 2d 249 (1943); State v. Canton, 131 La. 255, 59 So. 202 (1912); State
v. Young, 52 La. Ann. 478, 27 So. 50 (1899).
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LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
Louisiana is aware of the psychological pressure that can be brought
to bear on a suspect and is interested in preventing such compul-
sion. Article I, section 16 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974 pro-
vides, as does the United States Constitution, that "[n]o person shall
be compelled to give evidence against himself. ' 7 Article I, section 13
provides a set of procedural safeguards similar to those found in
Miranda to ensure the protection of the rights of the suspect in
custody." There is, in addition, some indication that the framers of
these constitutional articles intended to go beyond the confines of
the federal constitution and jurisprudence by providing even
greater protection for potential defendants. In 1978, the Louisiana
Supreme Court decided In re Dino.5 In that case, the court dealt
with Miranda as modified by Oregon v. Mathiason.7  The court
stated:
[I]f Mathiason represents a constriction of the Miranda definition
of significant deprivation of freedom of action, its holding clearly
does not govern our interpretation of Article I, § 13 of the 1974
Louisiana Constitution whose framers intended to adopt the
Miranda edicts full-blown and unfettered. Finally, it appears that,
in fact, there was an intention by the convention to go beyond
Miranda and to require more of the State .... "
Though Dino deals with a different aspect of Miranda than does the
instant case, ie., "custody" as opposed to "interrogation," the argu-
ment could be extended in order to modify the Innis decision to pro-
tect better the rights of an individual in custody. There is some in-
dication, however, that the Louisiana Supreme Court has adopted
the Innis decision "full-blown and unfettered." There have been two
decisions recently handed down in which Innis was cited. In the first
of these, State v. Jones,8 there appeared to be some hesitancy in
adopting the Innis test as the court ruled on the admissibility of
three incriminating statements made by a suspect in custody. Each
statement was held to have been admissible, but in dealing with the
third statement, one which was received under circumstances very
similar to those in Innis, the court found a "closer question."79 Even
though the court ultimately endorsed the admission of the statement
73. LA. CONST. art. I, § 16.
74. LA. CONST. art. I § 13.
75. 359 So. 2d 586 (La. 1978). See Note, A Cautious Step Foward, 39 LA. L. REV.
278 (1978).
76. 429 U.S. 492 (1977).
77. 359 So. 2d at 590. See Hargrave, The Declaration of Rights of the Louisiana
Constitution of 1974, 35 LA. L. REV. 1 (1974).
78. 386 So. 2d 1363 (La. 1980).
79. Id at 1366-67.
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into evidence, the court assumed that the statement was not ad-
missible in order to find that, even if it had been improperly in-
troduced, it had been harmless error. This hesitancy, however, was
overborne in State v. Castillo." The Castillo court, with no reluc-
tance, cited Innis and approved the admission of defendant's in-
criminating statement into evidence.
It is submitted that the majority's definition of "interrogation"
in Rhode Island v. Innis leaves too many questions unanswered. The
reader is left without knowing what "subtle compulsion" is or how
and when it may be used. He is left confused concerning the rationale
behind the fifth and sixth amendment dichotomy; it is unclear why two
distinct tests are applied to essentially similar factual situations. No
guidance is provided in the opinion as to what words or actions will
meet the Innis test of "interrogation." This writer suggests that the
dictates, reasoning, and purposes of Miranda would be served more ef-
fectively by adoption of the definition of interrogation offered by
Justice Stevens in his dissenting opinion: "In my view any statement
that would normally be understood by the average listener as calling
for a response is the functional equivalent of a direct question, whether
or not it is punctuated by a question mark."8 By focusing on the
perceptions of the "average listener," Justice Stevens' definition
makes a "reasonable man" of the trier of fact, rather than requiring
that he determine what a reasonable policeman should know. Applying
this test to the instant case, one perhaps would reach a different
result from that reached by the majority, a result more consistent
with the dictates of Miranda.
George W. Pugh, Jr.
LOUISIANA'S ALIMONY PROVISIONS:
A MOVE TOWARD SEXUAL EQUALITY
In a divorce proceeding the trial court ordered the husband to
pay alimony to his wife. He appealed, contending that Civil Code ar-
ticle 148, the basis for alimony pendente lite, was unnecessarily
gender-based and, therefore, unconstitutional under article I, section
3 of the Louisiana Constitution and under section 1 of the fourteenth
amendment to the United States Constitution. The First Circuit
80. 389 So. 2d 1307 (La. 1980).
81. 100 S. Ct. at 1694 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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